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In a recent monograph, Pauline Nestor asks if George Eliot 
continues to be relevant to us today. Contrary to some, who 
argue that Eliot “lives in a distant and unrecoverable country 
of her own.”1 Nestor insists that Eliot’s fiction “forms an 
extended, particularized and dramatic investigation of 
fundamental ethical problems”, especially those concerning 
ethical responsibility.2 I am in broad agreement with Nestor’s 
treatment of Eliot and in this paper will focus on the ethical 
problem of freedom and determinism as presented in 
Middlemarch. Let me add at the outset that I judge Eliot’s 
understanding of the embodied dimension of ethical life to 
bind her closely to some strands of contemporary ethical 
philosophy. More on this later. 
What do I mean by the ethical problem of freedom and 
determinism? Briefly, I refer to the problem raised by treating 
human being immanently, that is, as fully part of nature. If we 
do not stand above or outside nature then surely the same laws 
that govern the rest of nature must govern us? In other words, 
we must be part of a deterministic system. This “evolutionary”, 
or “godless”, view was familiar to Eliot. As is well known, she 
translated various works of Spinoza, Strauss, and Feuerbach, 
and was well acquainted with Comte’s positivist view of 
human history as a path of progress through the ages of 
religion and metaphysics to science.  
While there is certainly room for disagreement about Eliot’s 
view of human nature, I am inclined to read her as a Spinozist 
on the issue of freedom. On his view, although free will is an 
illusion, freedom is not. Moreover, freedom itself assumes 
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rather than contradicts a determined universe. If our acts are to 
deserve the designation “free” then there had better be an 
ordered world in which such acts will be efficacious. As 
Spinoza put it “liberty … does not take away the necessity of 
acting, but supposes it.”3 Put differently, my freedom to plan 
my life assumes a degree of consistency in the conditions that 
frame my actions. For Spinoza, and I would argue for Eliot 
too, freedom crucially depends on acquiring some 
understanding of the circumstances within which I act. This 
view, however, commits neither Spinoza nor Eliot to a hard 
determinism in the context of human sociability. Both thinkers 
conceived of society in broadly “organic” terms but both 
viewed the social rules, norms and other determining 
conditions of specifically sociable existence to be marked by 
historical and cultural variation and diversity. Rules and norms 
may be broken, natural laws cannot. Nevertheless, social rules 
and norms may act to both enable and constrain human action 
with extraordinary force. Often, this force is as implacable as 
any law of nature. It is Eliot’s demonstration of the 
implacability of social norms in provincial Middlemarch that I 
will take as the determining circumstances against which its 
various inhabitants pitch their character and so test the limits 
of their freedom. This freedom, I will argue, is intrinsically 
ethically structured. It is what links each to each as an 
embodied moral actor participating in an historically specific 
moral community. If we take seriously the idea that Eliot 
viewed society “organically” and as “incarnate history”4 then 
we must also concede that the possibilities open to social 
actors are, in some sense, embodied in their contexts.  
Eliot’s account of the normative forces that constrain action 
in Middlemarch is often signalled by the metaphors of weaving 
or of a web. Whether caught in the finest gossamer strands or 
the thickest and stickiest threads, no character escapes the 
overall design of the web. Lydgate, for example, despite 
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assuring Farebrother that he means to remain independent in 
order to pursue his science, soon begins to feel “the hampering 
threadlike pressure of small social conditions, and their 
frustrating complexity.”5 Whether they acknowledge it or not, 
this is the destiny of all the characters – each is not only caught 
in the web but each is also necessarily complicit in the ongoing 
task of spinning the web. 6 Such complicity and 
interdependence is the price exacted for inclusion in the human 
community.7 Eliot shows, again and again, the ways in which 
the freedom of each is conditioned by the freedom of every 
other. The moral development of any character in 
Middlemarch can be shown to be constrained or enabled by the 
choices made by others in the community. Of course, 
understanding these threads in normative rather than juridical 
terms means that the web may be torn. But norm violation 
attracts heavy costs. As Farebrother remarks: “If a man goes a 
little too far along a new road, it is usually himself that he 
harms more than any one else.” (601) In spite of the use of 
‘man’ and the male pronoun in this quotation, it is my 
contention that it is Dorothea Brooke who travels the ‘new 
road’ and who risks most through her willingness to break the 
‘threadlike pressure’ of what passes for ‘normality’ and 
everyday ‘decency’ in Middlemarch.  
Recall the opening pages of Middlemarch where Dorothea 
is described as ‘remarkably clever’ but lacking common-sense; 
who, although enjoying good “birth and fortune” could be 
found kneeling “on a brick floor by the side of a sick labourer” 
praying; who was capable of “fasting like a Papist, and of 
sitting up at night to read old theological books”; whose idea 
of the ideal husband was someone who could be “a sort of 
father, and could teach you even Hebrew, if you wished it”. In 
sum, Dorothea was “too unusual and striking” to gain the 
approval of Middlemarch. (pp. 7-10) But recall too the astute 
authorial observation, inserted in the middle of the description 
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of Dorothea: “Sane people did what their neighbours did, so 
that if any lunatics were at large, one might know and avoid 
them.” (9) Dorothea is, in this sense, a “lunatic” and the ideally 
feminine Rosamond is the embodiment of sanity.8 Dorothea’s 
exercise of the freedom that is available to her consistently 
involves breaking with the normative expectations of the 
Middlemarch community. Here, I will briefly mention four 
sets of norms that she violates.  
Norms of femininity:  She finds little interest in the 
occupations appropriate to her sex (embroidery, music, etc). 
Her judgement on such skills (that pass as accomplishments in 
Mrs Lemon’s school for ladies) is nicely captured in the scene 
where she refuses Sir James’ gift of “one of nature’s most 
naive toys”, a Maltese puppy. “It is painful to me to see these 
creatures that are bred merely as pets.” says Dorothea “I 
believe all the petting that is given them does not make them 
happy. They are too helpless: their lives are too frail. A weasel 
or a mouse that gets its own living is more interesting. … 
Those creatures are parasitic.” (28) It is worth noting here that 
Dorothea’s beloved Monk, a St Bernard, and this lap dog do 
share a common nature – no doubt some “wolfish” ancestor. 
But one has been bred for strength, the other for decoration. 
Each creature embodies its past breeding and conditions of life 
and although it is possible that some future relative of Monk’s 
may come to resemble the Maltese puppy more than Monk, 
Monk himself is incapable of being a lapdog. I believe Eliot’s 
insistence on showing the limitations to Dorothea’s freedom, 
(or, for that matter, the freedom of any other character in 
Middlemarch), derives from a similar insight to that provided 
by the difference between Monk and the puppy. In both cases, 
a significant passage of time is involved in transforming the 
one kind of creature into the other. Dorothea’s resistance to the 
gendered norms of Middlemarch is a crucial step in bringing 
about such transformation. 
Freedom and Determinism in Middlemarch 
 39 
Norms of the landowning class  Dorothea stands apart 
from those of her class in the concern she shows for the 
tenants. Not only does she engage in amateur architectural 
planning for new housing for them, she also is actively 
involved in providing schooling for the tenants’ children. 
While Mr Brooke may concern himself with the big picture 
politics of the time, especially the Reform Act of 1832, his 
tenants live in poverty and decrepitude. Dorothea wishes to 
reform the conditions of those around her, those whom she can 
see and feel are in need. Meanwhile, Brooke, and the 
‘masculine’ world generally, preoccupy themselves with the 
abstract idea of reform.  
Norms of marriage: Although some have complained that 
Dorothea’s life options are few - marriage being the most 
obvious - one should not lose sight of the transgressive nature 
of the actual marriage choices she does make. Her desire to 
“lead a grand life here – now – in England” is what drives her 
choice of Casaubon as husband. As she naively muses: “There 
would be nothing trivial about our lives. Everyday things with 
us would mean the greatest things. It would be like marrying 
Pascal” (27) Her marriage to Ladislaw is even more 
transgressive. Initially, neither Ladislaw nor Dorothea can see 
how it is possible for them to marry. Neither can see their way 
around “the crowd of indifferent objects” and the “world of 
reasons” [that] “thrust them asunder.” (597) The fact that this 
marriage involves the ultimate punishment for transgressing 
social mores – exile from one’s community – should not be 
overlooked.   
Norms of friendship: The norms of gender Eliot presents 
prohibit friendship between the sexes. The friendship that 
develops between Dorothea and Lydgate represents an 
enormous normative shift in ethical relations between the 
sexes. Dorothea’s faith in Lydgate and her courage in speaking 
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up publicly for him when all around (including his own wife) 
doubt his honour, puts her at the moral core of Middlemarch. 
Bulstrode’s loss of reputation is structurally inevitable in the 
unfolding narrative of Middlemarch. But Lydgate’s association 
with Bulstrode is the result of choices Lydgate makes himself. 
His honour and reputation are put at the mercy of the 
scandalmongers, in part, through his own actions. In great need 
of a friend, Lydgate is helped not by his male peers but by 
Dorothea, whose confidence in her own capacity to play this 
role derives from her belief that “nothing could have seemed 
more irrelevant … than insistence on her youth and sex when 
she was moved to show her human fellowship.” (716) 
Lydgate’s response to Dorothea’s belief in his honour warrants 
study: “It was the first assurance of belief in him that had 
fallen on Lydgate’s ears. He drew a deep breath, and said, 
‘Thank you.’ He could say no more: it was something very 
new and strange in his life that these few words of trust from a 
woman should be so much to him.” (717) And later, when he 
reflects on this exchange with Dorothea, he thinks, “She seems 
to have what I never saw in any woman before – a fountain of 
friendship towards men – a man can make a friend of her.” 
(723) From a contemporary perspective, it may be tempting to 
trivialise this encounter, but taking account of the norms of the 
time, I wish to stress the transgressive nature of this friendship 
and see in it an ethical advance in relations between the sexes.9  
Does Dorothea’s challenge to the norms of Middlemarch 
society seem trivial alongside her aspiration to lead a ‘grand 
life here – now – in England’? Does it make her a ‘lunatic’? 
Certainly, these acts are difficult to compare with the grandeur 
of a St Theresa or an Antigone. But such comparisons, 
arguably encouraged by the text itself (see “Prelude”, pp. 3-4 
and “Finale”, p. 785), miss the point. If one’s actions are 
conditioned by one’s circumstances as well as by one’s 
character, then the question Eliot leaves hanging in her 
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“Finale” deserves a carefully considered response: “Many who 
knew [Dorothea], thought it a pity that so substantive and rare 
a creature should have been absorbed into the life of another, 
and be only known in certain circles as a wife and mother. But 
no one stated exactly what else that was in her power she 
ought rather to have done.” (783) So, let us now confront, 
directly, the idea that Eliot often failed to provide her female 
characters with meaningful or non-traditional life options but 
rather allowed them to be defeated by circumstance.  
My view is that such readings fail to note Eliot’s 
commitment to portray her characters truthfully and 
realistically in situ. Moreover, they fail to consider Eliot’s 
view of social change as a matter of slow ‘evolution’ rather 
than rapid “revolution”.10 To get a clearer picture of my view it 
may be useful to reflect again on Eliot’s use of the framing 
device of the 1832 Reform Act. This Act is indisputably an 
important part of history. It heralded, if not directly delivered, 
the expansion of the democratising impulse in the West. But 
Eliot’s astute political sense continues to ask the hard 
questions: how do we get from here – the present, to there – 
the future? How can present conditions of life promote new, 
improved ways of life? Consider one example of Eliot’s 
exploration of social transformation in Middlemarch. Dagley’s 
spirited chastisement of Brooke, his landlord, reveals much 
more than Brooke’s failure to adequately provide for his tenant 
and his family. It also shows that Dagley’s capabilities are very 
much limited by his social and economic circumstances. 
Dagley’s capacity to grasp the Reform Act is very limited and 
his appreciation of the role that the King will play in forcing 
Brooke to treat his tenants decently would be risible were it not 
so tragic. Consider Eliot’s reflections on Dagley’s 
circumstances and his freedom to alter them: 
Some who follow the narrative of his experience may wonder 
at the midnight darkness of Mr Dagley; but nothing was easier 
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in those times than for an hereditary farmer of his grade to be 
ignorant, in spite somehow of having a rector in the twin 
parish who was a gentleman to the backbone, a curate nearer 
at hand who preached more learnedly than the rector, a 
landlord who had gone into everything, especially fine art and 
social improvement, and all the lights of Middlemarch only 
three miles off. As to the facility with which mortals escape 
knowledge, try an average acquaintance in the intellectual 
blaze of London, and consider what that eligible person for a 
dinner party would have been if he had learned scant skill in 
‘summing’ from the parish-clerk of Tipton, and read a chapter 
in the Bible with immense difficulty, because such names as 
Isaiah or Apollos remained unmanageable after twice 
spelling. Poor Dagley read a few verses sometimes on a 
Sunday evening, and the world was at least not darker to him 
than it had been before. Some things he knew thoroughly, 
namely, the slovenly habits of farming, and the 
awkwardnesses of weather, stock and crops, at Freeman’s End 
– so called apparently by way of sarcasm, to imply that a man 
was free to quit it if he chose, but that there was no earthly 
‘beyond’ open to him. (373) 
Dagley’s story is reason enough for us to concur with Eliot 
that the social state that frames choices in Middlemarch is 
indeed “imperfect.”  (784) But what would improve this social 
state? Given time, the Reform Act will bring improvement. 
But meanwhile, Eliot links Dagley’s conditions of life to those 
with whom he is most directly connected: the rector, the 
curate, the landlord, the inhabitants of Middlemarch, and the 
parish-clerk. Eliot’s focus on the everyday mores and the 
micro-political relations between Middlemarchers of all 
classes and both sexes highlights the ethical responsibilities of 
each person, as well as the way in which the freedom of each 
is connected to the freedom of every other. Middlemarch 
offers a history of the everyday acts that will, in time, become 
the determining past of its future possibilities. As she writes in 
the epigraph to chapter LXX, “Our deeds still travel with us 
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from afar,/ And what we have been makes us what we are.” 
(660) It is in this way that Eliot values the cumulatively 
embodied history of our acts over the abstract idea of reform. 
For it is the acts of those who dwell in the “unvisited tombs”, 
acts perhaps judged “unhistoric”, that construct our present and 
make it a better, or a worse, place than it might have been. 
(785) In the popular imagination neither the lower classes nor 
women are seen to be capable of ‘making history’. St Theresa 
and Antigone are the exceptions that prove the rule. 
Middlemarch, and especially the figure of Dorothea, offer a 
profound challenge to these popular understandings.  
After Casaubon’s death, but before Dorothea marries 
Ladislaw, a conversation takes place between Mrs 
Cadwallader (who functions textually as the “older woman” 
who polices the norms of Middlemarch) and Dorothea: 
 “You will certainly go mad in that house [Lowick] alone, 
my dear. You will see visions. We have all got to exert 
ourselves a little to keep sane, and call things by the same 
names as other people call them by” …  
  “I never called everything by the same name that all the 
people about me did,” said Dorothea, stoutly.  
  “But I suppose you have found out your mistake, my 
dear,” said Mrs Cadwallader, “and that is proof of sanity.”
  
  Dorothea was aware of the sting, but it did not hurt her. 
“No,” she said, “I still think that the greater part of the world 
is mistaken about many things. Surely one may be sane and 
yet think so, since the greater part of the world has often had 
to come round from its opinion.” (505) 
For me, herein lie Dorothea’s triumph and her courage and her 
greatness. She will risk calling things by their name, as she 
sees it, even at the cost of being thought a lunatic or being 
made an exile.   
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1  The words are John Bayley’s. Pauline Nestor quotes them in 
George Eliot (Palgrave: Hampshire and New York, 2002), p. 7. 
2  Nestor, p. 8. 
3  B. Spinoza, Tractatus Politicus, pp. 295-96. 
4  The term is Riehl’s and is used approvingly by Eliot in a review 
of his “The Natural History of German Life”. See Oxford 
Reader’s Companion to George Eliot, ed. John Rignall (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2000), p. 162. 
5  George Eliot, Middlemarch (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1998), p. 169. Subsequent page references will be to this edition 
and incorporated in the text.  
6  Note Eliot’s comment “any one watching keenly the stealthy 
convergence of human lots, sees a slow preparation of effects 
from one life on another, which tells like a calculated irony on 
the indifference or the frozen stare with which we look at our 
unintroduced neighbour. Destiny stands by sarcastic with our 
dramatis personae folded in her hand.” (88) 
7  That all communities – no matter how restrictive - nevertheless 
assume the freedom of its members is made clear by Eliot’s 
epigram to chapter LXIV: “cause it is not cause/ Unless effect be 
there; and action’s self/Must needs contain a passive. So 
command/Exists but with obedience.” (608) 
8  In support of this judgement, consider the sexually segregated 
conversations between the men of Middlemarch and the women 
of Middlemarch on the desirability of Rosamond versus 
Dorothea as a wife; see pp. 81-87. 
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9  Contrasting Dorothea’s and Rosamond’s very different 
relationships with Lydgate may strengthen the point. 
Descriptions of the Lydgate marriage are marked by the 
frequency with which they are described as belonging to 
different species: the “bird” and the “bear”; Rosamond as 
“mermaid”, and Lydgate’s bitter observation that “It seemed that 
[Rosamond] had no more identified herself with him than if they 
had been creatures of different species and opposing interests.” 
(560) 
10  The desire, “to show the gradual action of ordinary causes rather 
than exceptional”, is noted in one of Eliot’s letters with reference 
to Middlemarch in The George Eliot Letters, ed. Gordon Haight 
(New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1955), vol. v, p. 168, 
quoted in Nestor, p. 174, n. 4.  
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